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REAPING THE WHIRLWIND IN CHIHUAHUA:
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MINAS DE
CORRALITOS, 1911-1917

GEORGE E. PAULSEN

IN THE FURY OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION between 1911 and
1917, a large and unknown quantity of foreign-owned property was
seized or destroyed. Unfortunately for American investors in mining operations in northern Mexico, after dictator Porfirio Diaz was
overthrown, the new Constitutionalist government of President
Francisco Madero was unable to restore order in the face of a
revolutionary storm. Because of destructive raiding and the lack
of protection during the early years of the Revolution, American
mining property in remote areas, such as western Chihuahua, was
particularly vulnerable to attack, and many Americans were forced
to abandon it and flee to the United States. After President Woodrow Wilson decided to intervene in Mexican affairs in 1914, antiAmerican sentiment in that area became intense. As a result of this
hostility, the American-owned Minas de Corralitos, as they were
known locally, were deliberately destroyed by Mexican federal forces
in 1917. 1
Although the Revolution and the civil war have been of great
interest to historians on both sides of the border, few of them have
paid much attention to the effect of the insurrection on American
investment in the Mexican mining industry. Since the State Department refused to release the amount of the losses in the claims
filed against Mexico by American investors, the total has not been
established, is impossible to estimate, and may never be known.
Some information about them may be gleaned from the published
decisions of the American Special Mexican Claims Commission,
which reviewed the claims arising out of the Revolution. Archival
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records of the commission, however, provide historians with a much
better source of information on such losses, as well as on the problems Americans faced in protecting their property. The case of the
Candelaria Mining Company of San Pedro, which owned and operated the Minas de Corralitos, illustrates these problems and explains why the company was unable to obtain compensation from
Mexico, despite the fact that its property had been deliberately
destroyed. 2
The mines of Corralitos were located in the municipality of Nuevo
Casas Grandes in the Galeana District of northwestern Chihuahua,
about seventy-five miles below the border of New Mexico. The
tableland in this district, part of the rolling arid central plateau, is
covered with grass, Spanish bayonet, yucca, and cactus, and is
capable of supporting large herds of cattle when irrigated. Rising
from the open country are detached and serrated mountain ranges,
composed mainly of blue, grey, or white limestone. The hills in
the outlying reaches of the Sierra Madre are folded in domes composed of rhyolite resting on sharply sloping shale. In this area, just
north of the old Indian ruins at Casas Grandes, Spanish colonists
established settlements late in the seventeenth century. 3
Mining in the western part of the Chihuahua began in the eighteenth century. In the Spanish period, the village of Janos was the
military presidio of the area, indicating the importance of the industry, which reportedly yielded more than $20,000,000 in gold
and silver. Immense piles of slag and the ruins of the old hornosadobe smelting furnaces-and arrastras--erushing beds-indicated that the mines had been very productive. Because of Indian
depredations, however, they were temporarily abandoned and then
reopened in the early nineteenth century. During the independence movement after 1810, they were again abandoned because of
Apache raids. Indian problems continued until the latter part of
the century, and as a result, the Mexicans were unable to exploit
the mineral resources of the Galeana District to any great extent. 4
The mines at Corralitos were discovered in 1839 by Angel and
Mariano Aguirre and were acquired shortly thereafter by Jose Marfa
Zuloaga, who organized a company to work them. After his death,
the property remained in the hands of the Zuloaga family and
Ramon Remegio Lujan, who managed (propietario) the company
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until the property was sold to North Americans. 5 In 1880 the Zuloaga and Lujan families sold their estate and mines at Corralitos
to John F. Crosby and associates. In the same year, Crosby transferred his property to the Corralitos Company of New York, which
was organized by Edwin D. Morgan (1811-1883), president of E.
D. Morgan and Co., a New York City banking and brokerage firm.
Initially, the company was primarily engaged in raising livestock
and farming. 6
The Corralitos Company acquired its mines at a most inappropriate time. Between 1880 and 1886 the price of silver dropped
temporarily, and the prospects for the development of the mines
must have seemed unattractive. In 1884, however, the Mexican
government adopted a new mining code and tax law, which helped
to ease the burden on silver mining. Five years later, Morgan's
grandson, Edwin D. Morgan (1854-1933), organized the Candelaria
Mining Company of Coloraao to engage in gold and silver mining
in Chihuahua. A number of the directors of the new mining company were also directors of the Corralitos Company. In 1895 the
Candelaria Company bought 180,000 acres, later reduced to 80,000
acres, fr0m the Corralitos Company, thus formally separating the
mining and ranching operations. 7 .
Because Mexican law denied foreigners the right to own property
in the twenty league Prohibited Zone along the border line, in
1902 the directors of the Candelaria Company organized a Mexican
corporation, the Compania de San Pedro, S.A., to hold its mining
properties in the zone. Although .the property of the Candelaria
was transferred, it owned all the stock in the San Pedro Company,
except for a few shares held in the name of individuals as required
by Mexican law. The latter shares were, however, controlled by
the company. Several years later, the Corralitos Company also
transferred its land in the zone to the Compania Ramos, its Mexican
subsidiary, in order to comply with the law. And in 1909 the Candelaria Company was reorganized and incorporated in New Jersey. 8
Before the Mexican Revolution erupted, the Corralitos Company
operated a thriving 30-square-mile, 850,000-acre hacienda, with
more than 40,000 high-grade Durham cattle, 1,200 horses; and 180
mules on its ranches. It was subdivided into farms and ranches by
464 miles of barbed wire cross-fencing, and several thousand acres

Edwin D. Morgan (1854-1933), The National Cyclopaedia ofAmerican Biography,
1962 ed.
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produced alfalfa and other crops. The farms and ranches were
irrigated with water received by canal from the Rio Casas Grandes
and Rio Janos. Numerous ranch buildings, farm houses, and corrals
were scattered across the hacienda. 9
Of the principal mines of the Candelaria Company, the Candelaria, Leon-Congreso, San Pedro, San Benigno, and San Nicolas
were the most valuable. They produced not only gold and silver,
but also large quantities of copper, lead, and zinc ore. The Candelaria, San Pedro, and San Nicolas produced high grade sulfide
ore, which was found in narrow fissure veins in intrusive porphyry.
The Leon-Congreso yielded lead carbonate ore, which was found
in contact veins between limestone and porphyry. The ore was
shipped to El Paso on the Mexican Northwestern Railroad, which
also brought in essential supplies, including coal for the boiler
plant. 10
By the turn of the century, the Candelaria Company was operating a million dollar investment. Between 1900 and 1908 its mines
yielded more than $3,000,000, with the net average smelter return
running more than $700,000 per annum. The heaviest shipments
were about 8,000 tons per month, but were declining because of
increased flooding, particularly in the Leon-Congreso. During these
years, the work force fluctuated considerably, but averaged between 700 and 1,000, all but twenty-five of whom were Mexican.H
Because of the flooding problem and a decline in production,
the company embarked on an expensive modernization program.
Since the Leon-Congreso encountered a considerable flow ofwater,
the company began construction of a large pumping operation of
the air lift type. Small pumps capable of raising 6,000 gallons per
minute were installed in the lower levels. They pumped the water
into a large underground chamber, from which it was raised to the
surface by large engines. With the first large surface pump operating, the company hoped to raise production to 1,500 tons of ore
per month. After additional surface pumps were installed, it contemplated a great increase in the yield. Among other improvements, the shaft of the Congreso was enlarged and deepened, and
the drifts of the Leon were extended. 12
In addition to these improvements at the Leon-Congreso, the
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company operated a boiler house with self-charging stokers. The
boilers powered modern generators and compressors that provided
electricity as well as air for drilling and lifting the water. Two new
450-horsepower boilers were added, which doubled the plant's
steam generating capacity. By 1910 the pumping plant was capable
of handling 3,500 gallons per minute. Also at the mine were modern
carpenter, machine, blacksmith shops, and a completely equipped
assay office, which was rated as one of the best in Chihuahua. 13
Mining and maintenance facilities were equally modern at the
Candelaria mine, the best and most valuable. It had miles of drifts,
and water was not a great problem. A large warehouse provided
supplies, equipment, and tools for all the mines. The company's
main office was surrounded by a hotel, hospital, general store,
employee houses, corrals, and a wagonyard. The San Pedro mine
tunnel had 4,000 feet of track, ore cars, and modern equipment.
Two railroad spurs connected the Le6n-Congreso and Candelaria
with the Mexican Northwestern line. The mines were also served
by twenty-five miles of telephone line. 14
Just before the Revolution broke out, most of the new equipment
was in place, although two new cross-compound Corliss pumps at
the Le6n-Congreso had not been installed. A new 100-ton concentrating plant near the mine was ready for operation, and a survey
was being made for a spur to connect it with the Mexican Northwestern line. A tunnel connecting the Candelaria with the San
Benigno was being pushed, and a fifty-ton cyanide plant was being
contemplated, to be ready about February 1911. Despite the construction activities, approximately 500 men were employed in the
mines. Unfortunately for the company, however, although it had
invested more than $428,000 for the improvement of its mining
properties, it would never recoup its expenditure. 15
In November 1910 sporadic Maderista uprisings against the Diaz
regime broke out in Chihuahua, and the company soon found itself
in the vortex of a mounting revolutionary storm. In the following
month the rebel forces ofPraxedis Guerrero in the Galeana District
burned the bridges and tore up the tracks of the Mexican Northwestern line. Not only did train service become uncertain for months,
but rebel bands preyed upon travelers and mining camps and seized
bullion and supply trains. Initially, however, there was no violence
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against North Americans. Because of the interruption of train service, the Candelaria company could not obtain coal from Jmirez
and was forced to close down the pumps in the Le6n-Congreso
late in the month. Although federal troops arrived at Corralitos,
they could not prevent rebel bands from looting the company's
supplies or from again burning railway bridges. 16
By February 1911 the entire western part of Chihuahua was
without protection, and the rebels held all towns in the area of any
importance. Business was conducted under chaotic conditions, but
the Mexican Northwestern line rebuilt its bridges and tracks as
rapidly as possible and continued to operate. In March the rebel
forces of Pascual Orozco once again burned railroad bridges and
looted the company's coal. Although a force personally commanded
by Madero was defeated at Casas Grandes by federal troops, the
latter did not control the district and abandoned the town the
following month. After the battle, the Diaz regime disintegrated
rapidly, and in May Diaz abandoned his office and fled the country. 17
Although Madero became president in November 1911, he was
unable to restore order. Thousands of rebels were disappointed
with the meager discharge bonus offered to them by the government and refused to surrender their arms. Numerous rebel leaders
were disappointed with the positions offered them by Madero and
abandoned him. Disillusionment with his leadership soon turned
into open rebellion. Conditions in the Galeana district in western
Chihuahua remained chaotic in the fall of 1911, and after Orozco's
defection from the Madero government, danger to American residents increased. 18
With Orozco's repudiation of Madero, it seemed to Americans
in the district that the revolutionary movement had lost all coherence. The fighting appeared to be prompted by sheer lawlessness,
bravado, and scoundrelism. Although Pancho Villa remained loyal
to Madero, because of Villa's reputation as a bandit, Americans
considered him to be one of the biggest cutthroats in the state.
Villa later overcame his reputation, however, and became one of
the heroes of the revolutionary movement. 19
Because of the constant looting and the interruption of railroad
service, in the fall of 1911 George A. Laird, the Candelaria company's manager, shut down mining operations altogether. He com-
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piled an inventory of machinery, equipment, and supplies, valued
at over $410,000, and filed it with the American consul at Juarez.
In 1912 danger to Americans in the district increased because of
the failure of the United States government to protect them, and
because of rumors of an impending invasion by the United States.
In August 1912 the company's property was again looted by federal
forces of Gen. Jose Inez Salazar, who warned Laird that the safety
of Americans in the district could no longer be guaranteed. Consequently, Laird and the rest of the company's American employees
left the mines in the hands of a Mexican caretaking staff and fled
to Columbus, New Mexico, the closest point of safety. 20
The Rev~lution took a fateful turn in February 1913 when Gen.
Victoriano Huerta turned traitor, seized control of the government
in Mexico City, and allowed Madero and his vice president to be
murdered. Many insurgents in northern Mexico rallied in support
of the new Constitutionalist leader, Venustiano Carranza, the governor of Coahuila. Although Orozco was lured into Huerta's camp,
Villa joined forces with Carranza, supported the Constitutionalist
program, and became governor of Chihuahua in December. As
governor, Villa tried to maintain a precarious balance. Since he was
dependent on supplies from the United States, he protected Americans and their property in order to win the good will of the Wilson
administration and American investors. But he dared not alienate
the nationalist sentiment of the public, whose anti-Americanism
was quite strong by 1914. 21
Unfortunately for Americans in Chihuahua, Wilson's meddling
in Mexican affairs in 1914 reinforced anti-American sentiment and
undermined Villa's support among the Constitutionalists as well.
The capture of Vera Cruz by United States forces contributed to
the overthrow of General Huerta but was also denounced by Constitutionalist leaders as an act of war. After the rupture among
Carranza's generals and the ensuing civil war, Wilson finally recognized the Carranza regime as the de facto government of Mexico
in 1915. Villa was stunned by Wilson's decision, and United States
officials urged Americans to get out of areas the Villistas controlled.
Gen. Hugh Scott, Wilson's contact with Villa at the border, warned:
"His bridle is off." Thereafter irresponsible Villistas began murdering Americans and raiding towns across the border. Since the
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Carranza government could not control those marauders, in 1916
Wilson ordered Gen. John J. Pershing's expeditionary force into
Mexico to destroy Villa's forces. Unfortunately, the expedition was
a fiasco. Villistas easily evaded Pershing's troops, who clashed with
Carranza's federal forces instead. 22
Because of the impending war with Germany, Wilson agreed to
withdraw Pershing's force. The last unit rode out of Chihuahua
into Columbus, New Mexico, early in February 1917. Trailing along
behind them were five hundred wagons of Americans and friendly
Mexicans who fled to avoid certain reprisals. They were well advised to flee. Both irresponsible Villistas and federal units were
equally furious in taking revenge against Americans and their property in outlying areas of the state. 23
During the chaotic period of rebellion and civil war, the Candelaria company made no attempt to resume operations. Although
armed bands and individuals repeatedly looted the company's property, water caused more serious damage in the mines, particularly
in the Le6n-Congreso. Without fuel for the boilers, the caretaking
staff was unable to pump out the water and save the timber and
machinery. Such damage was due to the chaotic conditions caused
by the Revolution, however, rather than the result of a deliberate
attempt by Mexicans of any faction to destroy American mining
property. But because the mines at Corralitos were far from protection of the government in Mexico City, they were doomed. 24
In December 1917 a small group of federal troops under the
command of Gen. Severino Ceniceros arrived at Corralitos and
systematically demolished the property of the Candelaria Company. Not only did they wreck the boiler house, concentrator, and
hoist houses, but also the warehouses, hotel, stores, houses, and
indeed buildings of any kind. The assay office as well as the carpenter, machine, and blacksmith shops were looted and wrecked.
Whatever was of value and could be moved was carted off: machinery, equipment, tools and tons of copper, brass, steel, and
corrugated iron. Barbed wire fencing, cable, and telephone lines
were ripped out, rolled up, and hauled off. Roofs, doors, windows,
walls, floors, and timbers were taken by the wagon load. 25
What could not be removed was wrecked and left exposed to
the elements. After the roof of the boiler house was taken, rain
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rotted the timbers, which collapsed on the boilers. The compressor
was stripped of its brass and its cylinder heads were knocked in.
The roofing and flooring of the concentrator were ripped out and
the machinery hammered to pieces for its brass. All that remained
were the walls and tons of asbestos lying on the ground. At the
San Benigno, fire ruined the machinery, tools, and drilling steel,
and even warped the tracks. The railroad spurs to the Candelaria
and San Pedro were ripped up and the ties removed for firewood.
When enthusiasm for this orgy of destruction paled, the soldiers
gleefully sent ore cars down the tracks into the mines, wrecking
the cars and the machinery at the mine head. 26
During the first years of the revolutionary turmoil, Morgan, who
was president of the Corralitos and Candelaria companies, protested to the State Department about the looting of his properties
and appealed for protection. In 1912 Edward C. Houghton, manager of the Corralitos hacienda, and George Laird explained to a
subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that
Americans and their property could not be protected because the
Mexicans believed the United States would do nothing. Clearly,
American property in the outlying areas of the Galeana district was
beyond the protection of the Diaz regime in Mexico City and was
subject to looting during Orozco's rebellion against Madero. After
Villa took control of Chihuahua, mining property was protected in
order to raise revenue for the state. But since Carranza could not
pacify Chihuahua during the civil war, Morgan could not secure
protection of his property through the State Department. With its
mining facilities destroyed and its mines under water, the company
decided not to resume operations when order was restored. Instead
it went into receivership in 1917 and sought to recoup its losses
through a claim against the Mexican government. 27
Agreement on claims against Mexico for losses during the Revolution proved to be a complicated problem that took years to
resolve. Madero's government created a commission to review claims
arising out of the Revolution in 1911, and the U.S. Congress also
authorized a similar commission. Very little was accomplished under Madero, but Carranza promised indemnification of those who
had suffered losses the Revolution caused. Again, nothing was accomplished because of issues arising over the nationalization of
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mineral resources under the new Constitution of 1917. After Carranza was overthrown in 1920, the new government of Alvaro
Obregon offered to agree on a claims commission in return for
recognition. After prolonged haggling, two claims conventions were
approved at the Bucareli Conference in 1923 and ratified the following year. In addition to a general claims commission, a special
commission was to consider claims arising from acts of revoluti~nary
forces between November 1910 and May 1920. 28
With the negotiations for a claims convention underway, the
Candelaria Company receivers decided to obtain an estimate of
their losses at Corralitos. In 1921 Morgan, one of the receivers,
and Homer L. Carr, a mining engineer and general superintendent
for the American Smelting and Refining Company in northern Mexico, examined the property. They were unable to inspect the mines
since they were under water, but it was obvious that their timbers
had rotted and their machinery had rusted and that all would have
to be rebuilt. Carr estimated that rehabilitation costs would amount
to $300,000, of which $200,000 would be required to pump out
the mines. 29
Since rehabilitation was out of the question, the receivers decided to file a claim with the Special Claims Commission for the
company's losses. El Paso attorney Robert L. Holliday was engaged
to prepare the claim. He spent several years gathering copies of
deeds and affidavits of eyewitness testimony from former employees. In October 1926 the company's claim was filed with the American commissioner for losses in the amount of $710,675. This sum
included $410,000 for the inventory of supplies that Laird had
prepared in 1911 and Carr's estimate of $300,000 for rehabilitation. 30
A long delay occurred before the American commission took any
action on the claim, caused mainly by Holliday's failure to submit
adequate evidence in its support. He failed to obtain affidavits of
citizenship for a number of claimants, evidence of the total amount
invested in the property, or proof of the actual annual profits of
the company. No proof existed, however, that revolutionary or
federal forces caused all losses, or that company officers had appealed to local Mexican officials for protection. There was also a
question about the legality of the allotment of the San Pedro Com-
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pany's claims to American citizens without the approval of the
Mexican government. In addition, there was conflicting testimony
as to the value of property seized or destroyed. 31
Holliday's correspondence with the commission over a period of
years reveals that he never did supply the necessary evidence.
Although he was able to obtain copies of the articles ofincorporation
for the Candelaria and San Pedro companies, he was unable to
provide proof of American citizenship of the allottees of the latter.
In all fairness, he was unable to obtain affidavits as to their citizenship because they were elderly and could find no one to attest
to the circumstances of their birth. 32
Even though the record showed that the company had suffered
the complete destruction of its property between 1910 and 1918,
the commissioner decided that it had not proved its case. Satisfactory proof of ownership was lacking. American citizenship of the
owners of the Candelaria Company was established, but there was
no proof of that of the allottees of the San Pedro Company at the
time the losses were sustained. Moreover, no record showed the
conveyance of the mining property from the Corralitos Company
to the Candelaria and San Pedro companies. In addition, there was
insufficient proof as to the value of the property lost and the liability
of the Mexican government. As a result, in 1932 the commissioner
ruled that the evidence did not make a prima facie case and that
the company was not entitled to an award. 33
For several years thereafter there was no further consideration
of the claim by the commission. In 1935, however, it was again
reviewed, at which time attorney Louis W. McKernan suggested
a possible basis for an award. Even though the record indicated
that the owners of the Corralitos Company controlled the Candelaria and San Pedro companies, and although most of the Candelaria property seemed to be within the Prohibited Zone, the
Candelaria Company seemed to be the beneficial owner, regardless
of title, and as such might be entitled to an award of no more than
$50,000. Despite McKernan's suggestion, the commissioner refused to reconsider the claim. The claimants, he said, had ample
time to remedy the defects of proof and had failed to do so. Hence,
because of the inability of the company to satisfy the commission,
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it was unwilling to press Mexico for a nominal award, even though
the company's property had been completely destroyed. 34
The history of the Candelaria Company claim reveals the nature
of the problems that some American investors faced when they
sought indemnification for losses suffered during the revolutionary
period. Very simply, the company's receivers could not obtain an
award because their attorney was unable to construct a prima facie
case. He was unable to do so because he could not secure, or the
company could not supply, vital evidence as to the total value of
the property, the company's profits, or the citizenship of some of
the claimants. From the record it appears that the company's attorney was remiss and dilatory in his preparation of the claim.
Surely, the Candelaria Company could have supplied proof as to
the value of the property, the amount spent on improvement, and
annual profits through 1910. Such evidence, however, was not in
the record.
Whether the San Pedro Company could have submitted such
evidence as to its operations raises another question. Since the
company was a closely held subsidiary of the Candelaria Company,
it may not have kept a separate balance sheet. Such evidence was
not in the record and was an important omission because Mexico
contended that allotments for a share of damages a corporation
suffered had to be accompanied by a copy of its balance sheet.
In short, the manner' in which Morgan and his associates organized their companies undoubtedly made it difficult for them to
obtain compensation for their losses. As the American commissioner noted, a singular, and indeed, unusual lack of evidence
existed as to the Candelaria company's total investment in its mining property and its annual profits. One of the most striking aspects
of the case is the company's very modest claim for losses, only
$710,675, for an investment reputedly worth a million dollars and
producing more than $700,000 per annum before the Revolution.
Why the company limited its claim to only the loss of machinery
and supplies and the cost of rehabilitation is a matter of conjecture.
One problem in regard to evidence may be that the mining property was purchased as part of the Corralitos hacienda and was later
sold by Morgan and his associates to the Candelaria company, which
Morgan organized and controlled. Another was the organization of
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the San Pedro company by the Candelaria company to circumvent
the prohibition of foreign ownership in the Prohibited Zone. Since
it is unlikely that Morgan failed to keep records of the annual
production and profits of his companies, his failure to provide such
evidence may possibly be due to the falsification of records in order
to evade taxation.
Whatever the explanation, Morgan and his associates failed to
secure compensation from Mexico for their losses. In the Diaz
regime they seized the opportunity to exploit the rich mineral
resources of Chihuahua. But in the whirlwind of the Revolution,
their investment was swept away. Given their failure to present a
prima facie case, the refusal of the American commission to press
it against Mexico seems justified, even though Mexico's federal
forces had deliberately destroyed their property.
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